The Doyle Engaging Difference Program is a campus-wide collaboration between the Berkley Center and the Center for New Designs in Learning and Scholarship (CNDLS) to strengthen Georgetown University’s core commitment to tolerance and diversity and to enhance global awareness of the challenges and opportunities of an era of increasing interconnectedness. Doyle faculty fellowships support the redesign of lower-level courses to incorporate themes of cultural, religious, and other forms of difference, while Doyle Seminars facilitate in-depth explorations of similar themes in smaller, upper-level courses. In addition to curricular innovation, the Doyle Program supports the Junior Year Abroad Network, through which Hoyas blog about their encounters with diverse host societies, and Doyle student fellows, who engage intercultural and interreligious dialogue on campus. The program is made possible through the generosity of William Doyle (C’72), a member of the Georgetown University Board of Directors.

The Doyle Seminars foster deepened student learning about diversity and difference through enhanced research opportunities, interaction with thought leaders, and dialogue with the Georgetown community and beyond. Eligible seminars address questions of national, social, cultural, religious, moral, and other forms of difference. Faculty receive activity funds for their course, implement a rigorous research paper requirement, and arrange for one or more guest experts to provide feedback on student research. A final report documents the research projects completed by each student. Previous seminars have addressed topics ranging from globalization and foreign policy to same-sex marriage and interfaith dialogue.
**About the Course**

**HISTORY 305 - INTERNATIONAL HISTORY**

This course analyzes key phenomena in global and international history from the early modern period through the recent past. Topics include the military rise of the West, the Atlantic slave trade and its consequences, industrialization and inequality, the expansion of global capitalism and its discontents, and the emergence and evolution of the world’s most popular sport and its attendant entertainment industry. We investigate key questions over the course of the semester: What causes global historical transitions? Do individuals have any agency in such phenomena, or are they mere specks in the river of vast historical forces? How can we isolate and identify as a discrete global historical transition a process that unfolds in different ways in different places? How have people apparently marginalized or oppressed by global historical change shaped such change, requiring further investigation of the nature of this change? And lastly, what are the most effective strategies of narrative and organization for presenting an argument about such transitions?

The objectives of the course include a strong understanding of the large themes and movements that have shaped the modern world, the honing of scholarly analysis, and the understanding of global historical change as a set of processes that have not simply expanded from center to periphery but that have often doubled back upon themselves, bringing the periphery to the center in ways that deeply alter both.

**TRANSFORMING THE COURSE INTO A DOYLE SEMINAR**

In previous versions of the course, I had simply chosen an assortment of massive tomes on global history and instructed students to dig in. In redesigning this course as a Doyle Seminar, I sought to strengthen the narrative arc of the course as an investigation into the Rise of the West and its consequences for the rest of the globe, including the discontents it generated and the way it framed new popular struggles. Towards this end, we began with debates on the nature and meaning of the Rise of the West and then explored its connections to the Atlantic slave trade. From mid-semester on, we explored the way transformations on the global periphery led to adaptations and complications of apparent Westernization, often altering its meaning and political consequences decisively. Throughout, we sought to understand the ways in which actors from diverse origins interpreted and reconfigured the emerging rules and conventions of the modern world. Students then defined and developed their research topics with these priorities in mind. Redesigning the course as a Doyle Seminar, in consequence, strengthened the interpretive framework of the course, and helped to provide a more productive forum for student research.

**ABOUT THE PROFESSOR**

Bryan McCann is an associate professor of Latin American History and director of the Master’s in Global International and Comparative History (MAGIC) program at Georgetown University. He teaches courses on Colonial and Modern Latin America, particularly Brazil, and advanced topical courses on popular music in Cuba and Brazil and the history of Latin American Populism. McCann is the author of numerous articles and two books: *Throes of Democracy: Brazil since 1989* (2009) and *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil* (2004); he is currently researching a book on the neighborhood association movement that reshaped urban space and politics in Rio de Janeiro in the second half of the twentieth century. McCann holds a B.A. from Princeton University, M.A. from the University of New Mexico, and a Ph.D. from Yale University.
Communicating the Great Game
Sam Garrison (SFS’14)

Abstract: This paper explores how public pressure affected the British government’s policies during the Great Game of the nineteenth century. By drawing upon depictions of Afghan leaders to explore how the public was informed of events that occurred in Central Asia, this paper explores whether popular outrage over the execution of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Connolly at the hands of the Emir of Bukhara resulted in a change in government policy, and whether the government was more concerned with transparency or with securing its colonies.

Excerpt: The Great Game, a term made popular by Ruyard Kipling, refers to the series of skirmishes, conflict, and diplomatic tension and poker between Russia and Britain in Central Asia. The geopolitical tension centered on gaining control and protecting access of the overland passages to British India. The tension, though never erupting into direct conflict between Russia and Great Britain was often understood to be indicative of the divergent political realities in each state. This paper considers whether public opinion in Britain, shaped by reports and journals from Central Asia, could shape and force British policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The role of public opinion, and the subsequent decisions made reflect two significant paradigms within British society: fierce Russophobia and Orientalist assumptions about the Khanates of Central Asia. These paradigms can be identified throughout the recollections of travelers waged in print media and spoken debate, and are clear throughout the foreign policy decisions made by Britain.

Describing himself as “Late Curate of High Hoyland, Yorkshire, formerly missionary in Persia, Bokhara and Afghanistan”, Dr Joseph Wolff provides the most detailed, and complicated account of Nasrullah Khan. Taking upon himself the task of discovering the fate of Stoddart & Connolly, “to determine whether the two Britons were dead or alive,” Wolff travelled to the Emir’s court in Bukhara, and details the character of the Emir; “On his accession to the throne he killed five of his brothers… it is also said that the present king poisoned his own father”. Wolff also notes that the Emir “deprived the mullahs of all their power, and [took] the executive into his hands.”

This would seem to confirm the impression of the Emir drawn from Stoddard & Connoly’s letters, and fit cleanly in the Orientalist lens through which many of the Khanates were viewed. Yet Wolff, having barely escaped Bukhara due to a letter from the Shah of Persia, urges his readers “at the same we must not forget his good points”. Wolff explains that the Emir “expressed no contempt for England, but was exceedingly anxious to become reconciled to it; but the continual suspicions infused into his mind, made him hesitate dismissing me”. Wolff concludes that he thought it was a great mistake for Britain not to have tried to establish formal diplomatic relationships with Bokhara and the Emir.

Dr Wolff’s A Mission to Bukhara became one of the most popular accounts of the time, not least because of the controversy over the savage execution of Stoddart and Conolly. His depiction of Nasrullah Khan…is as confused as Britain’s relationship with this ruler throughout the Great Game.
THE SUBALTERN, GLOBAL HISTORY, AND AFRICA: SLAVES, SOLDIERS, AND MIGRANTS IN AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE
PETER STANTON (SFS'13)

Abstract: This paper evaluates the study of the subaltern and the current place of Africa in global histories, seeking out how historians can best re-center their work on these essential topics. It then puts these ideas into practice by examining how subaltern men and women, and in particular slaves, soldiers, and migrants, drove historical processes in the colonies of French West Africa. Although subalternity fundamentally shaped the lives of millions of West Africans, the nature of these individuals’ participation in colonial structures fundamentally shaped global history.

Excerpt: Does the field of subaltern studies offer a pathway to refocus historical inquiry on the experiences of common people, and most particularly on those whose voices remain the most neglected—the marginalized, or the subaltern—those subordinated according to their class, race, culture, or other relationships of dominance? In answering this question, this paper assesses the place of Africans in world history, and the links between the African continent and the concept of “modernity.” Lastly, this paper turns to the historical record, exploring the experiences of slaves, soldiers, migrants, and other subaltern groups in French West Africa, or Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). These groups undeniably shaped the creation and evolution of the AOF as a colonial entity, and their contributions to history had ramifications felt around the world. The stories of African slaves, soldiers, and migrants under the French colonial regime all contribute to the understanding of Africa in the modern world—the subaltern past informing a present of increasing complexity and interconnection.

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Beginning in the 1880s, the French government gradually took more and more measures against institutions of slavery in its West African colonies, led by its universalizing and legitimizing emancipatory discourses, as well as international agreements among the colonial powers. In 1903, administrators in the AOF were no longer permitted to consider slave status as legal, and in 1905 the colonial government banned transactions involving people. These acts ended legal enforcement of slavery in most of the AOF, although they were almost entirely ignored in the Sahara. Perhaps a million slaves left their masters throughout the colony, but most stayed with their households, even as master-slave relationships changed. In spite of its idealistic rhetoric, however, much about the French administration’s actions subtly allowed slave labor and commerce in people to continue, even through the end of the First World War. In the Senegalese peanut basin in particular, cadres feared that production of valuable exports would decrease due to emancipation. Across this corrupt and contradictory policy landscape, filled with danger as well as opportunity for freedom, slaves acted in innovative ways, driving social change in unique directions.

Imagine the life of a Wolof slave, working in a peanut plantation. Information on possibilities of liberty percolates to your ears in slow and convoluted ways, but over time it becomes clear that fleeing to Dakar in the west would assure your freedom—though not your material security, and certainly not that of your family. Villages de liberté also exist, where freed slaves are provided with tools and land, but none are located nearby, and you know that seeking out the protection of the few and disparate colonial authorities could only be done at great risk. Thus, slaves far and wide engaged in everyday acts to expand their independence little by little, gradually transforming the dynamics of power between them and their masters by leveraging knowledge of the colonial authorities’ stances on slavery. Through this process, many slaves became economically independent through their hard work, some becoming as wealthy as their masters and buying their freedom from them according to traditional norms.

Due to the nature of these evolving states of freedom, however, slave status remained highly significant in the western Soudan. Many former house slaves continued rituals of subservience despite having gained greater freedom for themselves. Many social structures continued to mark former slaves as the “other,” particularly codes of honor by which slaves could do many things the freeborn man would not, such as begging, making music, being freer with sexuality, and so on. Slaves also lacked the deeply traced genealogy and legitimated lineages expected for the freeborn. Even in the areas where slavery no longer existed at all in its classical form as a labor system, former slaves still often paid a tax called assaka to former masters and had to buy their freedom before they could perform the hajj—the pilgrimage to Mecca.
FRENCH LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD
KATHLEEN KOKENSPARGER (SFS’14)

Abstract: The focus of this study is the indirect transmission of French ideas in the realm of judicial development. Beginning with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, this study traces the creation of a French legal system in Egypt, the creation of a Franco-Egyptian system through the incorporation of Islamic ideas, and the impact of that system on the greater Arab world. Specific focus is placed on its expansion to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries with distinct government systems that have had very little direct French involvement. Through this analysis of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, this study argues that Egypt’s development of a French-based system and its combination with concepts of Islamic Sharia has enabled these secular European ideas to have an enduring presence in the Muslim Arab world.

Excerpt: Following the Arab revolutions of 2011, attention has once again turned to the governments of the Arab world and the laws that govern them. As nations such as Egypt struggle to establish a stable government justified by a legitimate constitution, the Western world continues to worry about the role Islam will play in these developments. This fear is perhaps most justified in Egypt, whose Muslim Brotherhood holds the presidency as well as a majority in the parliament. Recent drafts of a new constitution have spurred protests from Egyptian secularists, liberals, and non-Muslim religious groups alike, arguing that the proposed constitution leaves an opening for expanded Islamic legal influence.

This is not the first time that Egyptians have questioned the role of Islamic law in their judiciary, nor will it be the last. Within the last 300 years, constitutional changes as well as legal codification, revisions of those codes and changes in courts’ jurisdictions have all provoked questions on the degree to which Sharia, or Islamic law, should be implemented. However, merely tracing the origins and presence of Islamic law in the Egyptian system does not show a full picture of that country’s legal development. Equal focus must also be placed on the “other,” or those aspects of the law that are not Islamic in nature. Understanding these forces, their influences and how they have both converged and diverged with Islamic law can better enable an outsider to understand the complex dynamics and evolution of these modern Arab legal systems.

In his argument for a national legal system corresponding to Egypt’s true identity, al-Sanhuri argued that “French law has granted us hospitality, but the time has come to return home” (al-Sanhuri in Bocher 213). Home for al-Sanhuri was “no restoration of the Sharia pure and simple.” (Hanson 190) Rather, the system created under the 1949 Code was a “compromise position in legal development” between looking to Western law and looking to traditional sources for all solutions (Debs 2). In the words of Ahmed Kosheri, “the function that the draftsmen of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 intended for the Sharia was to blend a certain number of Sharia principles with the Western legal concepts forming the bulk of the Code” (Kosheri in Ayad 98).

As articulated in Le Califat, Al-Sanhuri believed that “When Islamic jurisprudence needs development, develop it, but when it conforms to the civilization of the present age, leave it as it is” (Al-Sanhuri in Hill 117). He argued that the Sharia was “in need of solid scientific renovation, in order to rescue it from intellectual stagnation.” To do so, al-Sanhuri made a distinction between religious rules and legal ones, using “pure logic” to apply the legal ones” (al-Sanhuri in Hill 184). After the completion of the code, the Ministry of Justice gave a statement declaring that they “adopted from Sharia all that we could adopt, having regard to sound principles of modern legislation” (Ministry of Justice in Hill 185). Modernity, as viewed in 1940s Egypt, meant westernization, so the Ministry’s claims proved that the Civil Code of 1949 was essentially the introduction of Sharia law into French law when applicable (Debs 99).
Excerpt: The Sandinista and Islamic Revolutions of the late 1970s were the results of theological movements that rapidly turned political. The religious ideologies that supported these movements—Liberation Theology in Nicaragua and Shi'ism in Iran—were rejections of the modernity and corrupt dictatorships peddled by the United States government. As such, both rebellions also relied on the marginalized lower classes as a base of support. Over time, however, differences in the ideology and approach of each movement resulted in diverging paths. Under the pressure of foreign intervention, the Sandinistas came to rely heavily on a dominant, Soviet-style state apparatus. The Islamic Revolution consolidated itself more successfully in Iran because it remained ideologically independent, and largely avoided direct confrontation with the United States.

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On the surface, Nicaragua and Iran appear to be about as different as two nations could possibly be. One is the small, resource poor legacy of Spanish colonialism, while the other is large, well endowed with oil, and the inheritor of the proud traditions of the Persian Empire. However, during the middle decades of the Cold War, these two countries found themselves in similar positions within the international community. During the 1960s and 1970s, both Iran and Nicaragua were governed by entrenched authoritarian regimes, both suffered from endemic poverty and possessed large and economically disenfranchised populations, and both bore long histories of interference by imperial powers. These economic and political realities created a perfect environment for the spread of reactionary and political theological movements, and ultimately resulted in the swift and violent overthrow of entrenched dictatorships.

Nicaragua and Iran of the mid-twentieth century also appear to lack any commonality of religious traditions. However theology played a crucial role in both countries’ revolutionary movements. Liberation Theology in Nicaragua and political Shi’ism in Iran were attractive movements to each country’s poor and marginalized populations because they promised a more inclusive economy, cultural self-determination, and a viable political alternative to the American or Soviet models. As a result, the religious beliefs of poor Nicaraguans and poor Iranians both became pure expressions of popular democracy during the late 1970s, which engendered rapid regime change.

The Islamic Revolution of 1978 and the Sandinista Rebellion of 1979 were both complex political events that incorporated fragmented influences. However, both movements relied heavily on theology to mobilize disenfranchised lower classes. Iran’s revolution resulted in a theocratic regime where Islam served as an ideological alternative to capitalism or communism. The contemporary Sandinista movement in Nicaragua created a secular government that incorporated Marxist elements. The ideological clarity of the Sandinista suffered due to the contradictory natures of Marxism and organized religion. This lack of ideological clarity led to the collapse of the revolutionary state in Nicaragua under increasing economic and military pressure from the United States.

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The political and economic disenfranchisement the poor created a toxic political atmosphere in both Nicaragua and Iran. Neither country possessed democratic structures for the poor to express their frustration in the political arena. Religion, however, remained of the utmost importance in both Nicaraguan and Iranian culture. In Central America, the Church traditionally sided with the conservative and wealthy minority, and helped contribute to the oppression of the poor. During the 1960s, the Second Vatican Council and the Medellín Conference changed the relationship between the Church and the rural poor, and contributed to an environment of political empowerment. In Iran, Shi’a theology did not experience the same doctrinal changes as Catholicism did in Nicaragua; but rather, it reemerged as the main form of protest against the Shah’s White Revolution and established itself as a political alternative to the modern ideologies of capitalism or communism. In both countries, theology became the only real expression of popular democracy, and its ability to empower the poor majorities provided the fuel for the revolutionary regime changes of the late 1970s.
Summary: The role of ailments and illnesses on geopolitical action prior to the twentieth century is undeniable, especially in the cases of European imperialism. While some early attempts failed entirely because of disease, quite a few nations overcame that obstacle to consolidate their rule over non-European peoples. This paper aims to examine three examples of imperialism in East Asia: the British in India, the French in Indochina, and the Americans in the Philippines. It will describe in-depth the problem of disease in each locale, how each colonizer overcame epidemics to cement their respective regimes, as well as the overall development of more sophisticated means of disease prevention over time, as illustrated by a comparison of the latter colonial efforts (the United States, and to a degree, the French) to the earlier ones (the British).

In a keynote speech before British aristocrats at the Hotel Cecil on May 10, 1899, Joseph Chamberlain, the then-colonial secretary, made one of the first public statements to connect the eradication of disease to the success of British colonialism. As he appealed to his audience’s pocketbooks, he promoted an agenda of ‘tropical medicine,’ extolling the benefits that it could bring the Empire:

“My lords and gentlemen, the man who shall…find the cure for malaria and shall make the tropics livable for white men…will do more for the world, more for the British Empire, than the man who adds a new province to the wide dominion of the Queen.”

This paper examines why and how that occurred, using three case studies: the establishment of British rule over India beginning in 1757, the French colonization of Indochina that followed the annexation of present-day South Vietnam in 1862, and the American colonization of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898. In all three places, the Western power realized that finding a solution to issues posed by disease was a requirement for the creation of a colony it could eventually prosper from. Not only did that protect the European expatriates—who were extremely susceptible to tropical illness—needed to conquer, defend, and administer the colonies, but it served to legitimate foreign rule in the eyes of the locals that benefited from improved public health programs. Accordingly, this paper describes the various strategies and the development of new forms of preventative medicine used to overcome indigenous ailments that allowed the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to avoid the fate that plagued some of their imperialist predecessors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The specific methods used to combat disease became increasingly sophisticated with the passage of time. Thus, there are considerable differences between colonial efforts in the 1700s and early 1800s, when the British colonization of India began, and those of the early twentieth century, when the United States embarked on its own adventure in Southeast Asia. While all three imperialists created some form of a public health bureaucracy in their respective holdings, there is a clear evolution in complexity and sophistication from the rudimentary ‘avoidance’ strategies of ‘Medical Topography’ used by the British (and also the French during their initial time in Indochina) to the scientific application of ‘germ theory’ through vaccinations and other actions in the latter period of Indochinese colonization and throughout the American experiment in Philippines during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Similar to the attempts to colonize the ‘New World’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western powers faced a ‘dilemma of disease’ throughout Asian colonization. Yet, unlike some of the failed colonies in the New World, where “yellow fever and malaria shaped the outcomes” of European endeavors in places like Cuba, Panama or British North America, Western powers in Asia overcame diseases to establish well-controlled and well-administered colonies.
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of World War One on the national self-identification of colonized populations in India and Senegal. The experience of World War One was as shocking a personal experience to them as it was to Europeans. Indians and Senegalese were sent to fight in lands far away from their home, and came in contact with new peoples and institutions. On one hand, they became disillusioned with the imagined icon of the mighty Europeans and began to demand the same liberties and respect from their colonial governments. On the other hand, the experience of warfare and estrangement brought them closer together and forged a sense of national identity. Despite the fact that India and Senegal had very different colonial experiences, the post-war changes were remarkably similar.

Excerpt: Senegalese veterans would come to play an important part in forwarding Senegal’s demand for independence. Upon return to Senegal, veterans of World War One formed the Veterans Association. Associations of that kind had been founded in all of Senegal’s communes and several towns in the interior of the country by 1919, soon spreading into the countryside as well. Those based in the towns soon began taking part in local politics. They helped local activists and were instrumental in the creation of Senegal’s first labor unions. These events were unprecedented in Senegal’s history and show the critical importance of World War One in boosting Senegalese confidence and sense of national identity. Mbaye Khary Diagne succinctly stresses this point: “Before you know well about life you have to enter the army. [Because once] you have been in the army and [fought in] the war, [compared to that] nothing [else in life] can [ever] give you a problem.”

In the end, it was mostly the veterans who took up the task of replacing Diagne as the prime advocates for radical change. They soon began to express their discontent in “modern” ways by actively promoting social change. Soon, their position became even more radical, as some rejected colonialism entirely and called for independence. Their wartime experiences in France influenced them to such a degree that they came in direct contrast to the expansion of French administrative control over Senegal. The French may have achieved greater bureaucratic control over Senegal, but they were swiftly losing key interest groups, primarily the veterans. Though their groups were ignored during the interwar years, they finally achieved their objective in 1960.
Summary: From its inception, the French Communist Party (PCF) had complicated and often contradictory relationship with French colonialism and imperialism. On the one hand, the PCF was often the largest organization in the nation backing anti-colonial causes—whether it was supporting rebels in the Moroccan Rif War, publicly decrying France’s colonial exposition of 1931, or fueling Metropolitan French opposition to the Algerian War. But on the other hand, the PCF was often unable to maintain its commitment to this supposed core tenet of the international communist movement—the party directly oversaw the colonial apparatus when it joined the government of the Popular Front of the late 1930s, and repeatedly wavered on Algerian independence.

A variety of factors explain the PCF’s shifting views on the colonial question: shifts in Comintern policy that instructed the PCF to ally with socialists and liberals, the party’s national political objectives, and the specificity of French imperialism in Algeria. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it seems the PCF was still subject to France’s powerful colonial ideology and the nation’s mission civilatrice—a political project born from French republicanism and universalism.

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Three years after the October Revolution ushered the Bolsheviks into power, French socialists gathered in the city of Tours to discuss whether or not to accept the 21 conditions of membership required by parties wishing to join the newly-formed Communist International. (…) At the Tours congress, a young delegate from Indochina named Nguyen Ai Quoc—later known as Ho Chi Minh—spoke out against the evils of French policy in Indochina and in favor of affiliating with the International: “We see in adhesion to the Third International the formal promise of the Socialist Party to finally give colonial questions the importance that they deserve,” Quoc told the crowd. “In the name of all socialists, from left to right, we tell you: Comrades, save us!” When the majority of delegates in Tours voted to join the Third International, the Communist Party was born, and for the first time ever in France, there was now a major political party that was supposedly dedicated to abolishing the nation’s empire.

But while the French Communist Party was theoretically founded on opposition to colonialism and support for national liberation movements across France’s far-reaching colonial empire, its actual track record on these matters was ultimately very mixed. At times, the party was, as colonial historian Alain Ruscio put it in an interview, “the only political organization that challenged [the colonial] consensus” in the nation. And yet, at other times, the PCF would condone that national consensus and even target and support the repression of nationalist movements in the colonies. Operating under the influence of a broad colonialist ideology, French Communists struggled to develop a coherent line on the matter, before pressure from the Comintern and internal party re-organization triggered a shift in 1924-1925 that saw the PCF prioritize opposition to French imperialism and support for national liberation movements. Eventually, another volte-face in Comintern policy saw the party move from fiercely contesting French imperialism to supporting it.

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Up until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Communist Party reverted to an assimilationist stance on Algeria, often evoking the boogeyman of fascism. As it abandoned its ties with the pro-independence ENA, the PCF supported the founding of the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) in 1935, an assimilationist party that parroted the analyses of its Metropolitan overlords which equated support for pro-independence movements as support for fascism. In 1938, the PCA secretary Kaddour Belkaïm declared that “conceiving of Algerian independence without the French-Algerian alliance … is crazy and criminal … it’s playing the game of international fascism to give oneself up to provocations demanding independence.”

All in all, there was an odd sort of parallel between the PCF’s stances on Algeria in the Popular Front period and its position in the early 1920s that had been condemned by the Comintern—in both cases, the party rejected independence, insisted on Algerian unity with France, and postponed Algerian self-determination until the hypothetical Communist seizure of power in France. There was also another important ideological return to the PCF of the early 1920s—a defense of the French Republic, and its colonial holdings, as an essentially progressive entity. Well after the Popular Front had fallen from government, in February 1939, PCF leader Maurice Thorez delivered a now famous speech in Algiers on the topic of the “Algerian nation in formation” laden with Republican paternalistic undertones. The Republic would oversee the process of uniting Algeria’s various ethnic groups—Jews, Arabs, Berbers and Europeans—and would ensure the development and emancipation of this new nation. Under the threat of fascism, the echoes of France’s old “civilizing mission” were apparently alive and well.
ENDNOTES

1. Wolff, Joseph; Letter to the Morning Herald (Richmond); July 2nd 1843.
2. Ibid.
10. Moitt, 40-42.
15. Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 192.
18. Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 204-5.
21. Sivan, 97. “Concevoir l’indépendance de l’Algérie sans l’alliance franco-algérienne, en face d’un fascisme international agressif et assoiffé de conquêtes coloniales, c’est fou et criminel … c’est faire le jeu du fascisme international que de se livrer à des provocations en réclamant l’indépendance.
22. Ageron, 36.
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